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ABSTRACT 
The global economic crisis has highlighted the continuing problem of tax evasion. For tax 
agencies to respond, an important antecedent necessitates knowing the extent of the problem. 
This study is the first to comprehensively review recent research on the tax gap. Our primary 
contributions are two-fold. First we argue that the tax gap, as conventionally defined, is 
conceptually flawed because it fails to capture behavioral responses by taxpayers adequately. 
Our second contribution is to review methods for measuring the tax gap and compare empirical 
estimates. We suggest that many of the most trenchant criticisms of conventional tax gap 
measurement (and the ‘hidden economy’ measures that underlie them) leave only microdata-
based measures of tax non-compliance as likely to deliver more reliable tax gap estimates. Even 
here, however, further work is required, on both conceptual and empirical aspects, before tax 
gaps suitable for policy analysis (e.g. implications for enforcement policy) are likely to be 
delivered. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Tax evasion is both pervasive and endemic. Following renewed international interest in the 
problem by policy makers such as the OECD, this study reviews the literature on the 
measurement of the tax gap. The ‘tax gap’ – broadly, the difference between tax revenues 
collected and those that would be theoretically expected to be collected in the absence of any 
evasion or late payment – are increasingly popular as a means of assessing the degree of success 
with which a particular tax or tax system is implemented. They have also been proposed as 
possible performance indicators for tax collection agencies. 
 Once a theoretical tax base is established, a tax gap can, in principle, be calculated. The 
methods used to date relate to measures of the ‘hidden economy’ or ‘hidden income’. As this 
study demonstrates, almost all of the methods proposed or implemented have been subjected to 
severe criticisms and they ignore any consideration of behavioral response. 
 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section outlines some 
definitional issues and highlights some conceptual problems with existing approaches. It also 
documents tax gap work conducted by the IRS (Internal Revenue Service) in the U.S. In the third 
section we examine issues concerning measurement of the tax gap, reviewing methodological 
issues, and reporting evidence from empirical studies of the size of the tax gap or the hidden 
economy. Much of this literature does not distinguish the separate contributions of different taxes 
within overall tax gap estimates. Sections four and five respectively provide discussion and 
concluding remarks. 
 
DEFINITIONS, CONCEPTUAL ISSUES, AND THE U.S. TAX GAP 
There are several possible definitions of the tax gap. Most have been developed within tax 
agencies to capture the aggregate tax revenue (for a specific tax or tax system) lost through non-
compliance. In the U.S. the ‘official’ IRS definition is simply: 
“The difference between the tax that taxpayers should pay and what they actually 
pay on a timely basis”.1 
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Plumley (2005) notes that this defined gap is split into three components: non-filing (failure to 
file a return), under-reporting (of income and also overstating of deductions), and under-payment 
(failure to fully pay reported taxes owed). 
 Other definitions of the tax gap found in the literature include those employed by, for 
example, Giles (1997b; 1999b), who first define the ‘hidden economy’ or ‘hidden income’. This 
is designed to capture income that is earned but is hidden from the tax authorities and, usually, 
official statisticians. The tax gap is then defined as hidden income multiplied by a suitable tax 
rate. This raises numerous conceptual and measurement issues, such as: what is included in 
hidden income, and what is a ‘suitable’ tax rate? 
The IRS definition of the tax gap, as well as definitions used by other tax agencies, all 
attempt to capture the notion of revenue losses through non-compliance with the tax code. 
However, conventional tax gap measures do not formally consider how the ‘theoretical’ tax base 
from which the theoretical tax liability is calculated, may differ when tax authorities alter 
enforcement policy to change the extent of non-compliance, compared to estimates based on the 
current extent of non-compliance. That is, they ignore taxpayers’ behavioral responses.2 
For example, an extra dollar raised in tax revenue may not always reduce the tax gap by a 
dollar. The condition of a 10% improvement in compliance (say, from 0.8 to 0.88) producing a 
10% increase in tax revenues is achieved only if the theoretical tax base is unaffected by changes 
in the tax rate or changes in the proportion of income hidden from taxation. In fact it is likely that 
greater compliance success and/or higher tax rates which raise the taxpayer’s effective tax rate 
would serve to reduce the total tax base (as distinct from changes which affect only the extent to 
which the tax base is hidden).3 
The U.S. Tax Gap 
The U.S. has by far the most extensive record, of any country, of tax gap measurement. The 
Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) was used by the IRS to distinguish 
statistically between compliers and non-compliers for risk assessment purposes. It involved 
detailed line-by-line audits of all types of tax returns conducted on a periodic basis (the 
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‘Individuals file’ contained around 50,000 cases, the ‘Corporates file’ contained around 33,000 
cases). TCMP audits were conducted from 1963 until 1988 when they were suspended as public 
officials believed the burden on taxpayers imposed by the random audits outweighed the benefits 
derived from the TCMP. 
 TCMP audits were used to measure the difference between reported taxes and taxes owed 
for randomly selected taxpayer samples. This information was then extrapolated to the entire 
population of taxpayers using the sample weights associated with each stratum of the sample 
(Ricketts, 1992). Thus, measures of the U.S. tax gap became commonly reported. The IRS also 
made TCMP data available for research projects which, in the opinion of the IRS, had the greatest 
potential contribution to the IRS and the community. Several of these studies were then published 
in the U.S. economics and tax literature; for a review, see Andreoni et al. (1998). 
 To overcome the burden of TCMP, the IRS in 2000 devised the NRP (Brown and Mazur, 
2003), the first phase of which was completed in 2005. Under NRP, compliance data was 
gathered from 46,000 randomly selected individual taxpayers (with an over-sampling of high 
income returns). NRP first classifies each return using a group of experienced auditors to identify 
likely issues. Then using available information documents, classifiers categorise returns as 
“accepted as filed”, or for a “face-to-face” audit or a “correspondence” audit. Line-by-line audits 
were performed on a “calibration” sample of 1,600 audits and, using comparisons between the 
calibration and non-calibration samples, the IRS was able to determine the efficacy of the 
classification process. 
 In 2006 revised estimates of the 2001 tax gap were released by the IRS showing an 
overall compliance rate of 83.7% (Bloomquist, 2006; Mazur and Plumley, 2007). Then in 2012, 
the IRS released estimates of the 2006 tax gap (shown in Figure 1). With 2001 figures in 
parentheses, the latest estimate of the gross tax gap is $450 billion ($345 billion) with a virtually 
unchanged overall non-compliance rate of 16.9 percent (16.3 percent). IRS enforcement activities 
and other late payments recover about $65 billion leaving a net direct tax gap of $385 billion 
($290 billion in 2001). 
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[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 The three key characteristics of the U.S. tax gap estimates are as follows: 
i. Over 75% of the net tax gap is attributable to the individual income tax which is the 
largest single source of Federal receipts. 
ii. Over 80% of the gross tax gap ($376 billion) is from underreporting (i.e. income 
underreporting and overstating deductions/credits) with roughly half this amount 
(including self-employment tax) attributable to underreporting of net business income 
by individuals. Around 16% of the gross tax gap is attributable to underpayments of 
taxes or failure to file returns. 
iii. Non-compliance is highest among taxpayers whose income is not subject to third-
party information reporting or withholding requirements.  
 Both TCMP and NRP audits did not account well for three types of compliance: (1) 
under-reported informal supplier income, (2) under-reported tip income; and (3) general under-
reported income not subject to third party information reporting (Alm and Erard, 2005) and 
Plumley (2005) outlines how the IRS corrected these three areas. 
With the IRS work at the federal level, several U.S. states have ‘piggybacked’ and 
calculated their own tax gaps. California’s annual income tax gap is estimated at $6.5 billion 
(12.4% of the $52.6 billion personal and corporate income taxes collected) and is based in part 
upon estimates from the federal gap (Legislative Analyst’s Office, 2005). Minnesota Revenue 
(2004) conducted a study on 1999 data and found that 88% of individuals voluntarily filed and 
that the direct tax gap (10.5%) of $604 million was comprised of $124 million (21%) for Non-
filers and $479 million (79%) for Underreporting by Filers. Almost all of the $479 million of 
underreporting was attributed to non-wage income. Finally, in a similar manner to Minnesota, the 
New York State Department of Taxation and Finance (2005) undertook a personal income tax 
compliance baseline study using 2002 data and estimated a direct tax gap (13.9%) of $2,838 
million, comprised of $516 million (18%) for Non-filers and $2,322 million (82%) for 
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Underreporting by Filers. The reports from these two states show relatively consistent results 
using similar methodologies. 
 The IRS compliance measurement program involves large costs and the outputs are 
subject to time delays i.e. the 2006 estimates became available in 2012 (Mazur and Plumley, 
2007). Thus, in most other OECD countries, there has hitherto been reluctance among tax 
agencies to enter into large-scale random audit programs intended to provide an overall measure 
of the tax gap. Conversely, many countries, e.g. Australia, do use random audit programs on a 
more limited basis to assess compliance and trends in specific areas of tax risk.  
In sum, apart from the U.S. federal approach, there are few official country studies of tax 
gaps (see Table 2). Rather the approach has been to estimate other concepts such as the ‘hidden’ 
economy, from which overall tax gaps are then sometimes derived. The issues in these studies are 
relevant here however, and are now analysed. 
 
MEASUREMENT ISSUES 
This section first discusses alternative methods used to measure the ‘conventional’ tax gap 
(defined earlier) or ‘hidden income’ measures from which tax gaps are obtained. It then discusses 
some estimates that have been produced for a number of countries using a variety of methods and 
assesses the merits of these estimates, and finally discusses the role of effective tax rates as tax 
gap measures. 
 Much of the academic literature on this subject is concerned with measuring the ‘hidden’ 
economy (variously referred to as ‘underground’, ‘shadow’, ‘informal’, ‘black’, ‘grey’ etc.) rather 
than the tax gap per se. However, at least when certain approaches to tax gap measurement are 
followed, measuring the underground economy is a first stage in that process. The methods for 
measuring the underground economy are therefore considered below alongside direct approaches 
to tax gap measurement.4 
 Further, most of the literature which focuses on tax gap measurement via measurement of 
the hidden economy does not distinguish between types of taxes. Typically both conceptual and 
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empirical tax gap measures of this sort are designed to identify total missing tax revenues. In 
some – but relatively few – cases, this is broken down by tax type including corporate and/or 
personal income taxes. There is very little literature on tax gap measurement for other direct 
taxes, such as stamp duties, wealth taxes, property taxes etc.  
A number of different approaches have been advocated to measure the tax gap or hidden 
economy. To measure a direct tax gap requires accurate measures of both direct tax actually 
collected and the theoretical (hypothetical) tax collection that would result if all direct tax 
liabilities were fully identified and enforced. 
 To identify the theoretical tax liability requires either 
(a) an accurate measure of the full extent of tax non-compliance, including the revenue loss 
associated with late payment; or: 
(b) an independent estimate of the direct tax base (e.g. from a source outside the fiscal authority) 
and an accurate estimate of the appropriate average tax rate that would be applicable to that 
tax base were it to be realized. 
 Where (b) is adopted, prior research, discussed later, tends to forget that accurate 
estimation of the appropriate tax rate is just as important as getting estimates of the theoretical tax 
base. This tax rate is likely to differ depending on the nature of the hidden income, profits etc. For 
example, not all income identified by some measures as ‘hidden’, is taxable. This applies to 
household production (unpaid housework, child rearing etc.) which is included in some measures 
of the hidden economy. Similarly some illegal activity is excluded from some hidden economy 
measures but is potentially taxable when identified. 
 Clearly the characteristics of the income or profit earner are also important in deciding 
the appropriate tax rate to apply to any hidden income. For example, in the U.S. if most tax 
evasion was by high earners the appropriate income tax rate on any hidden income is likely to be 
around 35%, whereas if most evasion is by low earners the appropriate tax rate may be 10% or 
even 0%. In the case of corporate income the effective marginal tax rate could vary widely across 
taxpayers, depending on legitimate deductions available to offset the corporate tax liability. 
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Alternative Hidden Economy and Tax Gap Measures 
The literature on hidden economy / tax gap measurement can be categorized into those that use: 
(A) micro approaches, based on taxpayer data or surveys to identify the extent of tax non-
compliance or undeclared income; and 
(B) macro approaches, which generally estimate the size of the hidden economy. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 In the macro approaches, the identified ‘missing income’ is usually assumed to be 
taxable, but most studies do not take the next step of calculating the tax gap. Those that do (e.g. 
Giles, 1999b), make simple assumptions, of unknown accuracy, about the relevant tax rate to 
apply. 
Micro Methods 
In Table 1, micro methods (i) and (ii) are ‘direct’ in the sense that they seek to measure missing 
tax or taxpayer income based on samples of individual taxpayers. From these, some form of 
‘grossing-up’ exercise allows total missing tax or income, across all taxpayers, to be estimated. 
This is the method used by the IRS, described in the preceding section. It requires randomized 
survey or audit methods to select taxpayers and sufficiently large samples, otherwise the grossing 
up exercise will be biased. Unfortunately, identifying the required sample size is difficult and, 
without additional independent sources of information, it is very difficult to determine how 
representative the selected samples are. Alternatively if risk-based criteria are used to select 
samples of taxpayers for assessment of non-compliance, suitable ‘grossing factors’ must be 
identified before the extent of non-compliance across all taxpayers can be identified. Since these 
methods have been described in the preceding section they will not be discussed further here, but 
some criticisms of their application in the U.S. are discussed in a further sub-section below. 
Discrepancy Methods 
Methods (iii) and (iv) are ‘discrepancy methods’. That is, they estimate the tax gap – or more 
usually the hidden economy – based on the difference between a reported income measure and an 
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independent measure of income that is believed to include hidden income. In practice these latter 
measures are likely only to capture a fraction of total hidden income. Discrepancy methods can 
either compare two national accounting type measures of the economy, independent of fiscal 
data, or can compare aggregates based on fiscal data with alternative, independently collected 
aggregates (as occurs with the Value Added Tax gap in the U.K.). 
 For income estimates from which a personal or corporate tax gap may be estimated, this 
is more difficult for a number of reasons. Firstly, comparisons of national income derived from 
the income and expenditure methods are often used to measure hidden income. This generally 
uses the balancing item, required to reconcile estimates from the two methods, to infer 
information about the size of the hidden economy. 
 While the two ways of measuring national income likely differ in the extent to which 
they capture hidden economic activities, the balancing item can be expected to be influenced by 
numerous other factors so that, at best, only crude estimates of the size or growth of hidden (and 
taxable) income can be expected from this method. In particular, year to year changes in these 
types of measures are likely to have much more to do with measurement error and other factors 
affecting the data series than genuine changes in the extent of hidden income (Breusch, 2005a; 
2005b; 2005c).  
 In addition, national income estimates sometimes rely on income data provided by the 
fiscal authorities so that comparisons with fiscal income data are not valid. In the UK, for 
example, National Account data on corporate profits are derived, in part, by adjusting tax agency 
sourced taxable profit data. As a result the two data series cannot be used to measure ‘hidden 
profits’, potentially liable to corporation tax. For examples and critiques of this method, see 
McAfee (1980), Tanzi (1983), O’Higgins (1989), Thomas (1999). 
Single Indicator Methods 
Method (v) generally assumes that there is a direct link between the size of hidden income (or 
reported plus hidden) and some other variable, such as the amount of cash in the economy. Using 
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the level of, or trend in, this latter variable to proxy the level or growth of hidden/total income 
allows this to be compared with reported income levels or growth. 
 Two major weaknesses of this approach are: 
1. To identify (or ‘anchor’) the size of hidden income at any point in time requires either that 
there was no hidden income at some point or the relationship of hidden income to the proxy 
variable is known for at least one year. 
2. The change over time in the proxy variable is entirely due to changes in hidden income. 
 Consider, for example, currency demand models (e.g. Tanzi, 1983) where the idea is to 
relate the amount of currency in circulation in the economy to various determining factors 
including the size of the economy (GDP), payment methods, interest rates etc. Any residual 
currency, unexplained by those variables, is then typically regarded as due to hidden economy 
transactions (which are assumed to be in cash). This residual is then related to variables such as 
the tax burden for different types of tax, government regulations etc. to identify factors that 
contribute to the hidden economy. Clearly if the growth of the hidden economy is measured by 
the movement over time in this ‘residual’ currency (or the part explained by the hidden economy 
proxies) then all other potential contributors to the residual are ignored. 
 However, by the nature of regression methods, the time-series of residuals has a zero 
mean which would imply that the hidden economy is negative in some years (which has no 
meaning!) and is positive in others. So, most such methods rely on some other observation 
‘anchoring’ the hidden economy’s size for a particular year and then using the time series of 
residuals to chart year-to-year changes. 
Multiple Indicator Methods 
Method (vi) in Table 1, ‘multiple indicators, multiple causes’ (MIMIC) models, are similar to 
method (v) but the hidden economy (though unobservable) is assumed to be capable of being 
partially captured by at least two ‘indicators’ (e.g. currency and GDP levels) and to be associated 
with two or more causal variables (e.g. tax rates, business or labour market regulations). As 
shown in Figure 2, the basic method is to treat the hidden economy as a latent (unobservable) 
- 11 - 
variable and estimate a set of parameters (the αs and βs in Figure 2) that relate the latent variable 
to the ‘causes’ and ‘indicators’ respectively.5 
 Applying MIMIC models to hidden economy or tax gap measurement has become 
increasingly popular in recent years with applications across many developed and developing 
countries; e.g. Giles (1997b; 1999b; Giles and Tedds, 2002b), Bajada and Schneider (2005), 
Schneider (2006) etc. Breusch (2005b) argues that applications of latent variables models are 
most appropriate for psychometric studies where, for example, individuals’ “intelligence” may be 
unobservable but can be ‘indicated’ by various test scores and ‘caused’ by a variety of factors 
such as genetics, parental and social backgrounds etc. 
 Applied to hidden economy or tax gap measurement MIMIC models have the advantage 
over single indicator methods that they allow several indicators of the hidden economy to be used 
simultaneously and a similarly large number of potential causes. However, they suffer from the 
same defects as the single indicator methods outlined above: namely problems of ‘anchoring’ and 
attributing all trend growth in the resulting latent variable to the hidden economy. 
 Figure 3 illustrates Bajada and Schneider’s (2005) application of MIMIC models to 
Australia. Notice that there are just two indicator variables (on the right), the parameters for 
which have been obtained by setting the value of one of them to 1.0. The parameters on the 
variables on the left-hand-side indicate the relative sizes, and statistical significance, of variables 
hypothesized to influence the latent variable (i.e. the ‘shadow economy’). Figure 3 shows the left-
hand-side variables are mostly tax- or welfare benefit-related, reflecting the authors’ hypothesis 
that government intervention is the main measurable determinant of the hidden economy. 
[Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here] 
 However, as Breusch (2005a, 2005b, 2005c) shows in a series of trenchant and 
devastating criticisms of these MIMIC applications, the estimated parameters in such models 
cannot identify the absolute size of the hidden economy, merely (at best) its relative size in each 
year. In addition he shows that, of the so-called ‘causal’ variables, typically only one drives 
almost all of the time-series variation in the latent variable. Thus, criticising Giles and Tedds’ 
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(2002b) study of Canada, Breusch (2005a) shows that the “dominant ‘cause’ of the underground 
economy comes from price inflation”. A further substantial part of the explanation derives from 
“movement in concert with the general expansion of the Canadian economy as measured by real 
GDP”. That is, the factors that the original authors claimed to be key, such as tax burden variables 
or the growth of self-employment, turn out to be marginal or almost redundant in determining the 
estimated hidden economy index (the latent variable). 
 For the Australian case, a similar outcome can be seen from the parameter estimate for 
disposable income (Figure 3), which is much larger than the other tax/benefit related ‘causes’. 
Similarly, the parameter estimate for the GDP indicator is almost three times that on the currency 
indicator even though it is the latter that might be expected to better represent hidden income. 
 Finally, Breusch demonstrates that the estimated size of the hidden economy ‘index’ is 
sensitive to the units of measurement of the causal and indicator variables (e.g. whether they are 
measured in absolute currency millions, billions etc.; in proportions, or percentages of GDP, etc.). 
This latter characteristic means that these methods cannot provide any estimate of the absolute 
size of the hidden economy, even though various authors continue to do so. Discussing Bajada’s 
(1999, 2003) estimate of the size of the hidden economy in Australia, at 15%, for example, 
Breusch (2005c, p.394) concludes that “a key parameter is set to an unrealistic value that makes 
the estimates many times too high”. 
 In addition, as the New Zealand and Canadian applications demonstrate (Giles, 1999b; 
Giles and Tedds 2002a, 2002b), the determination of the hidden economy index by one or two 
macroeconomic variables means that there is typically a long-term upward trend in the estimated 
size of the hidden economy or tax gap index. (This occurs despite the removal in some cases of 
the non-stationary properties in the original data). The authors then interpret this upward trend as 
evidence of an inexorably growing hidden economy, or tax gap, over time. In fact, it likely has 
more to do with the fact that real and nominal GDP, or currency demand and GDP, grow at 
different rates over the long-term. These may or may not be related to what is happening to the 
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size of the hidden economy in reality, but the measured index certainly cannot be relied on to 
capture the growth of that hidden economy accurately. 
Estimates 
As might be inferred from the above review (and our assessment in a sub-section below), it is our 
view that all the estimates of tax gaps, total tax gaps or hidden economy measures are subject to 
measurement error. They are often measuring quite different things yet definitions of the variable 
of interest can frequently be vague. Not surprisingly therefore, the estimates that we summarise in 
Table 2 from a variety of studies across several countries, reveal a wide range of values. 
Schneider (2006) reports hidden economy sizes for 145 countries, using MIMIC methods (which 
we do not attempt to summarize here). 
 Panel A of the Table 2 (adapted from Cebula and Paul, 2000) reports an assortment of 
estimates for the U.S. hidden economy in different years, and IRS tax gap estimates. From even a 
cursory glance it is clear that annual estimates can vary considerably over a short period of time. 
Panel B summarizes evidence for a number of countries based on results from a variety of 
methods. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Assessment 
In an earlier section we argued that conventional definitions of the tax gap are misleading because 
they omit behavioral responses. The conventional tax gap will therefore be an inaccurate estimate 
of the ‘true’ tax gap to the extent of these responses. Even ignoring this, assessing the reliability 
of conventional tax gap estimates (or the hidden economy estimates that underlie them), is 
difficult, not least because the various reported measures capture quite different things yet 
definitions of the variable of interest are often vague. In addition, measurement errors are 
generally of unknown magnitude, but are likely to be large in most cases; and may vary 
considerably, even within the same study. 
 As a result, a shift in a tax gap index of, say, 10% from one year to another (e.g. from 1.0 
to 1.1), might be dominated by margins of error of, say, 30% around each estimate. Authors of 
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hidden economy or tax gap estimates almost never provide this kind of information, which would 
allow judgments to be made about the reliability of the estimates produced. 
 Nevertheless, from what we know about the sources of data used to produce tax gap 
estimates, the quality of the methods adopted, the potential for error within methods and non-
comparability across them, we posit that in many cases the margins of error associated with 
individual estimates are just too big for these methods to form a reliable guide to year-to-year 
changes in tax compliance or ‘tax gaps’. 
 In support of our contention, the absolute size of the hidden economy or tax gap estimates 
in any one year also appears to be subject to large margins of error. This is perhaps most evident 
in the case of Australian evidence, where the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) estimates the 
hidden economy around 2% with a maximum of 4.8%, whereas Bajada (1999, 2003) claims it is 
around 15%. The ABS used national accounting data/methods while Bajada used MIMIC 
modelling. 
 Because most tax gap estimates are based on macro variables, which typically involve 
estimates of the hidden economy, they are conducted at a high level of aggregation. Thus, even if 
they could be measured with much smaller errors, they are unlikely ever to provide accurate 
indices of income tax gaps. Further, the criticisms of MIMIC methods by Breusch serve to 
highlight the non-robustness of this, increasingly popular but misguided, method of estimating the 
size of the hidden economy or tax gaps. 
 This leaves the use of taxpayer compliance-based measures as the most likely to yield 
estimates that can be associated with taxpayers’ direct tax liabilities. However the problems with 
these are essentially two-fold: Firstly, as the IRS’s experience demonstrates, these can be very 
resource-intensive both for fiscal authorities, and in terms of taxpayers’ compliance costs. 
Secondly, as section two argued, at best they allow some estimate of the unpaid tax on a tax base 
that is grossed-up from small observed taxpayer samples, typically without any allowance for the 
likely behavioral responses by those taxpayers. 
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 As an example, imagine that the IRS was able to levy all of the tax that would be legally 
liable on companies were all of their tax avoidance and evasion activities to be detected and 
rendered taxable. This would raise the effective tax rate on those companies and would serve as a 
signal to all companies that corporation tax was being more rigidly enforced in the U.S. In these 
circumstances a (possibly large) fraction of the US corporate tax base would shift to lower tax 
jurisdictions. To the extent that this happens such measures of the tax gap would indicate a 
reduced (or even eliminated) tax gap, but only because a large potential tax base has disappeared. 
Interestingly the U.S. Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA, 2009) noted 
that the IRS has not yet developed an estimate for the international tax gap. Further, after 
reviewing and assessing the recent IRS improvements to its tax gap measurement the Inspector 
General (TIGTA, 2006, p. 2) concluded:  
“Our analysis focused on whether there was sufficient, complete, and accurate 
information to determine whether the composite tax gap projections are reliable. We 
concluded that … the IRS still does not have sufficient information to completely and 
accurately assess the overall tax gap” 
Effective Tax Rates and the Tax Gap 
It is often noted that different companies appear to have quite different effective (average) tax 
rates (ETRs – tax paid as a percentage of total profits) despite a common federal rate schedule. 
This is sometimes taken as an indicator of ‘missing’ tax. However ETRs can vary across 
companies for many legitimate reasons. For example, a company may be carrying forward large 
losses from previous periods or its profits may be largely made overseas. Any of these conditions 
may qualify the company for relief under the tax code and so reduce its liability. Simply 
observing cross-company differences in ETRs therefore says little about the amount of tax 
avoided. 
 Nevertheless, given concerns about possible effects of tax avoidance on company ETRs, 
these have been the subject to significant research effort since the mid-1980s. This was initially 
associated with a series of reports by the lobby group Citizens for Tax Justice who campaigned 
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that the largest U.S. multinationals were paying less than their fair share of taxes (e.g. see 
www.ctj.org/corpfed04pr.pdf). Accordingly empirical research focused on whether there was a 
link between ETRs and firm size (e.g. Callihan, 1994). 
 Following this strand of research (which has yielded conflicting findings), researchers 
also tested for associations with other characteristics such as capital intensity, leverage, industry 
membership as well as the influence of tax preferences (Gupta and Newberry, 1997). Difficulties 
with this research include the absence of a consistent and accepted underlying definition, as well 
as access to revenue authority data (Harris and Feeny, 2003). In addition, to the extent that 
research confirms ‘size’ or other effects on ETRs, these could reflect a number of factors 
unrelated to avoidance. 
 Nevertheless, where companies find mechanisms of questionable legitimacy by which to 
reduce their tax liability, clearly this ‘tax avoidance’ can reduce their ETR. The crucial question 
for tax gap measurement is whether this ‘avoidance’ is deemed to be legitimate tax planning or 
tax evasion; if indeed it is identified and challenged at all by the tax authority. If a company has 
successfully hidden the full extent of its true taxable income, its ETR will be lower and for this 
reason, where ETRs are observed to vary across companies and sectors of the economy, they may 
provide a useful risk assessment tool for company tax evasion/avoidance. However, since many 
factors contribute to these ETR differences, aggregating them across companies or sectors to get a 
measure of the aggregate tax gap would not be legitimate. 
 It follows that, for the same reasons, using ETRs as performance measures of tax 
inspectors, or tax agencies more widely, would not be appropriate. ETRs may vary depending in 
part on the effort expended by the tax authorities in raising revenue; indeed it would be surprising 
if devoting additional resources to tax compliance did not yield some additional revenue. 
However, this is likely to be only one, perhaps small, contributory factor to the size of company 
or sectoral ETRs. The IRS does not use ETRs as performance measures; to do so would risk 
penalizing or rewarding a tax agency for ETR changes beyond their control, and/or failure to 
penalise/reward them for changes they do induce. 
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DISCUSSION 
This review suggests that there are few, if any, reliable methods of measuring direct tax gaps as 
conventionally defined. All macro methods involve estimating the aggregate ‘hidden’ or 
‘shadow’ economy to get a measure of hidden income. The methods used for this have been the 
subject of intense debate and much criticism. In addition, the failure of conventional approaches 
to incorporate behavioral responses by taxpayers when estimating ‘theoretical tax liabilities’, 
raises questions over the reliability of most tax gap estimates. 
 The areas that seem likely to deliver most progress in achieving more reliable tax gaps 
estimates, in our view, are the following. 
(i) Assessing the implications of the existing literature on taxpayers’ behavioral responses, 
both to changes in statutory tax rates and the extent of compliance enforcement. 
(ii) Where necessary, use the lessons from this literature to develop estimates of the 
relevant behavioral responses. 
(iii) Focus research on micro methods and data which measure taxpayer non-compliance 
directly. 
(iv) Consider carefully the appropriate tax rates to apply to tax bases when these are shown 
to evade current tax. 
 On (i) and (ii), there is already a considerable, and expanding, literature on taxpayers’ 
behavioral responses to a number of taxes e.g. Feldstein (1995, 1999); Slemrod (2001a, 2001b). 
In addition an extensive literature on the Laffer curve has sought to assess how far this particular 
construct captures behavioral responses. For a review and estimates using various datasets, see 
Goolsbee (1999). 
 On (iii), micro methods based on grossing-up from taxpayer compliance data seem the 
most likely to deliver suitable direct tax gap measures. Of the two methods used – taxpayer 
surveys and random audits – the latter is clearly the most accurate but also the most costly. For 
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this reason, even the IRS which devotes considerable resources to its random enquiries program, 
has not devoted the kind of resources required to produce reliable aggregate tax gap estimates. 
 The main problem to be overcome with current survey methods is the unreliability of 
revealed responses by participants. For example, Feige (1990) reports the outcome of the use of 
randomized response techniques to assess misreporting by respondents to an IRS taxpayer 
opinion survey on tax evasion. Thus, using “both direct questions (with assurances of anonymity) 
and a randomized response technique, revealed that the randomized response yielded evasion 
estimates between 62% and 433% higher on some questions than the direct question approach.” 
(Feige, 1990, p. 994).6 Clearly these margins of error are too large to allow much credibility to be 
attached to any individual survey result. 
 Taxpayer audits therefore appear to provide the most reliable evidence on potentially 
taxable income (either personal or corporate) that has escaped taxation. They also yield a more 
direct measure of the tax gap, because the question of the appropriate tax rate to apply to the 
hidden income is more readily dealt with. Clearly, the reliability of grossing-up is an issue that 
requires further research, since this depends on how representative are the samples examined. 
Random, or stratified random, sampling provides the best option but often relatively large (i.e. 
costly) samples are required to guarantee they are representative. 
 An area of literature that deserves further attention is the extent to which tax compliance 
data from risk-based enquiries/audits could be used for tax gap measurement. Though more 
difficult to gross-up than random enquiry data, risk-based enquiry data are more readily available 
and tend to generate less resistance from taxpayers (who typically expect the most likely 
offenders to be targeted). The key research issue here is to identify how readily missing tax data 
from risk-based audits can be generalised to the less risky taxpayer segments. This is an area 
where assessing the merits of the academic literature on non-random sampling could be valuable, 
and where careful analysis of risk measures used by tax authorities could yield progress on tax 
gap measurement. 
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 The main constraint on this progress at present is that tax agencies rarely have sufficient 
resources to devote to this kind of research, whilst academics – who tend to have a comparative 
advantage in this area – are not routinely allowed access to the necessary data. Research in the 
U.S. by, for example, Feinstein (1991), Feldstein (1995, 1999) and Slemrod (2001a) suggests that 
with greater access by researchers to (suitably anonymized) taxpayer data, it may well be that 
much greater progress towards a more reliable taxpayer audit-based tax gap measure could be 
made. 
 Finally, on (iv) above – measuring tax rates correctly – existing research is limited on the 
issue of whether income that currently evades tax could be taxed at the same rate as declared 
income, when the non-declared income is identified. Most hidden income, when it is identified is 
likely to be eligible for a number of tax deductions, depending on the form of the income and the 
type of taxpayer. Even where taxpayers do not make real behavioral changes in response to a tax 
agency’s compliance efforts, they often respond by legitimately changing the ways in which their 
income or deductions are recorded for tax purposes. This suggests that the expected tax rate 
applicable to previously undeclared income could be quite different from that applied to initially 
declared income. For example, when some previously hidden self-employed income is 
discovered, it may become preferable (i.e. tax minimizing) to incorporate in order to qualify for 
corporate tax deductions not available to the self-employed. That is, though it may not have been 
worth incurring the costs of incorporation so long as the self-employment income remained 
hidden, it becomes worthwhile when the income is revealed. As a result the taxpayer’s marginal 
tax rate is lower than that observed for previously declared income. This sort of response is not 
necessarily revealed directly by taxpayer audits since it may occur in future tax years as an 
indirect consequence of the audit. Further effects may arise if non-audited taxpayers learn from 
observing the behavior of those audited. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
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To conclude, we argue that all of the ‘conventional’ estimates of the tax gap are likely to be 
unreliable because they ignore behavioral responses that could be large in some cases. Even 
ignoring this problem (as prior literature does), essentially there is only one method for 
calculating tax gaps for direct taxes, directly; that is, to use taxpayer compliance data per the 
IRS’s approach. All other methods rely on estimating ‘hidden income’, or the ‘hidden economy’, 
via macroeconomic aggregates of various sorts. This latter method is also generally not capable 
of identifying specific tax gaps for direct taxes but only for taxes in aggregate. For indirect taxes 
such as VAT, data are often collected independently of the tax collection agency (such as 
household expenditure surveys) against which tax agency-sourced data can be compared. Even 
here however, potential inconsistencies in collection methods and definitions, suggests caution 
with regard to the margins of error in indirect tax gap estimates derived in this way. 
 For direct taxes, there is often no suitable independent data from which to estimate the 
theoretical tax liability against which to compare tax agency-sourced data. This is especially true 
for companies where national accounting data on profits (the tax base for company taxes) are 
either unsatisfactory – as with operating profit data for the financial sector – or are based on 
profits data from tax agencies. For personal incomes, survey methods can yield independent 
estimates for the income tax base to compare with data collected by tax authorities. However, 
even here there are likely to be margins of error (within each dataset) that suggest caution when 
comparing them. In addition, it is typically difficult to assess which taxes would be levied on the 
hidden income, were it to be revealed, and the appropriate tax rates that should be applied. 
 We have also argued that the appropriate size of the theoretical tax base – from which tax 
gap estimates would be derived - is not independent of the tax system itself. In particular, where 
the direct tax base is mobile between tax jurisdictions (or between taxes within the same 
jurisdiction), higher tax rates are likely to cause some out-migration of that base to lower tax 
jurisdictions (or tax types). As a result, even if the tax authority’s ability to collect revenue 
remained unchanged, a change in tax policy could alter the total potential tax that could be raised, 
and hence tax gap estimates. These arguments apply equally to changes in tax enforcement. 
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Hence, greater effort to collect (previously uncollected) taxes from a given tax base raises the 
effective tax rate that taxpayers face (when these compliance efforts are successful) and hence 
may cause changes in that tax base in order to legitimately avoid the additional tax liability. 
 We have summarized our assessment of taxpayer compliance-based methods of 
calculating tax gaps, in sections three and four. These appear to be the most feasible means of 
estimating tax gaps, but are still vulnerable to the ‘tax base migration’ aspects discussed above. 
The judgment of those who have carefully reviewed the use of these methods in practice, for 
example in the U.S., is generally that they are highly resource intensive both for tax agencies and 
for taxpayers (Bloomquist, 2006). 
 In particular, the most reliable estimates appear to be associated with random taxpayer 
audits. However, since by definition these audits do not target those taxpayers which risk 
assessments would suggest are most likely to avoid their tax liabilities, they impose additional 
compliance costs on many honest taxpayers. This, in itself, could impede attempts to improve 
taxpayer compliance and reduce the tax gap. Even in the U.S., where tax gap measurement is 
most advanced, the resulting official estimates are still regarded as unreliable. For this reason, 
various other countries such as Australia have decided against official tax gap measures both for 
direct and other taxes. 
 Estimates that are available from the academic literature tend to confirm the view that, 
while there probably are observable and measurable variables that are related to ‘hidden income’ 
that is not fully taxed, these methods are not sufficiently robust, and input data are insufficiently 
reliable, to yield tax gap estimates that could be used for tax policy or compliance assessment 
purposes. 
 It would seem that it is difficult, if not impossible, both to measure the absolute size of 
unpaid tax in any one year, and how this changes from year to year. Margins of error around most 
estimates are not generally reported but are probably sufficiently large to render annual changes 
in these estimates to be well within likely error bands. Tax gap estimates using taxpayer 
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compliance data, such as those produced by the IRS, though hopefully more accurate, probably 
represent a lower bound on missing tax revenue.  
 Having examined various studies on tax evasion and how this may help to measure ‘hard-
to-tax’ income, Vaillancourt (2004) aptly concludes: 
“The relationship between the shadow economy and the percent of compliant income 
with respect to the individual income tax is not a simple one. In addition, tax compliance 
with respect to other taxes also needs to be related to the shadow/underground economy. 
… the answer is a more or less weak relation, which raises at least caution with respect 
to the use of the size of the underground economy to measure the importance of hard-to-
tax income” (p.93). 
 Finally, while this study has considered the measurement and use of tax gap estimates, 
we leave it to others with respect to the challenging issue on exactly how to reduce the tax gap 
(e.g. GAO, 2005; 2007, 2012). 
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 Fig. 1.   IRS Estimates of the US Federal Tax Gap for 2006 
 
Table 1. Alternative Tax Gap Measurement Methods 
(A) Micro (‘direct’) 
approaches 
(B) Macro (‘indirect’) approaches 
(i) Taxpayer auditing / 
compliance 
(iii) National income-expenditure discrepancy methods 
(ii) Taxpayer surveys (iv) National income-fiscal discrepancy methods 
 (v) ‘Single indicator’ models: 
- Labor force participation 
- Transactions-based 
- Currency-based 
- Electricity use-based 
 (vi) ‘Multiple indicator’ (MIMIC) methods 
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Source: Bajada and Schneider (2005) 
 
 Fig. 2. The MIMIC Model Approach 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bajada and Schneider (2005) 
 
 Fig. 3.   Bajada and Schneider’s (2005) Results – Australia 
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Table 2.   Hidden Economy and Tax Gap Estimates 
Panel A: United States * 
Study Estimate in Current 
Dollars (billion) 
Estimate in Percent of 
GDP 
Year 
IRS (various) 145 8.0 1976 
Feige (1994) 600+ 28+ 1979 
Tanzi (1982, 1983) 118-159 4.5-6.0 1980 
Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (1993) 
184 5.4 1983 
US Dept of Labor 500 10.0 1992 
IRS (2005) 312-353 15.0-16.7 
(% of tax rev) 
2001 
IRS (2006) 
 
IRS (2012) 
345 (gross)** 
290 (net) 
450 (gross) 
385 (net) 
16.3 (% of tax rev) 
13.7 (% of tax rev) 
16.9 (% of tax rev) 
14.5 (% of tax rev) 
2001 
 
2006 
Note: * See Cebula and Paul (2000) for references in this table; ** Compares to $311 billion using ‘rules’ 
from 1988 and earlier IRS studies. 
Source: Adapted from Cebula and Paul (2000), and IRS (2005, 2006, 2012). 
Panel B: Multiple Countries 
Study Size of hidden 
economy (% GDP) 
Country Year 
Frey & Weck-Hanneman 
(1984)* 
4.1% , 8.0% 
8.3% , 8.8% 
13.2% 
Japan , UK 
US , Canada 
Sweden 
1978 
Schneider (1997)* 15% OECD average 1994 
Park (1979)* 4% US 1978 
Feige (1982)* 33% US 1978 
Tanzi (1983)* 2.6% US 1970 
Pommerehne & Schneider 
(1985)* 
11% US 1970 
Bhattacharyya (1990)* 3.8% 
11.1% 
8% 
UK 
1960 
1976 
1984 
ABS (2004)  2% (max. 4.8%) Australia 2000 
Bajada (1999, 2003) 15% Australia 1995 
Giles and Tedds (2002b) 3.5% (lowest) 
15.6% (highest) 
Canada 
 
1976 
1995 
Giles (1999b) 6.7% (lowest) 
11.3% (highest) 
Tax Gap: 
1.6% (6.4%)** 
3.9% (10.2%)** 
 
 
New Zealand 
1968 
1994 
 
1968 
1994 
Swedish Tax Agency (2006) 6.5%*** 
10% & 6%*** 
Tax Gap: 
5% ** 
4.2% ** 
 
 
Sweden 
2004 
2002 
 
1979 
2000 
Legislative Analyst’s Office 
(2005) 
8% (of tax revenue) California, US 2005 
HMRC 8% UK 2010 
Note: * as reported by Giles (1999b); ** = percent of total tax liability; *** using different methods: 
cash/GDP ratio (6.5%), national accounting (10%), & tax auditing (6%);  See Warren and McManus (2006) 
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Source: Breusch (2002b) 
 
 Fig. 4.   The Canadian Hidden Economy (% of GDP) 
 
 
 
 
Source: Giles (1999b) 
 
 Fig. 5.   The New Zealand Tax Gap (% of GDP & tax liability) 
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APPENDIX 
 Evidence for Canada and New Zealand 
The evidence for Canada and New Zealand is worth more detailed examination because it illustrates some 
of the difficulties with the main methods used – currency demand and MIMIC models. Figure 4 shows 
Giles and Tedds’ (2002b) estimates of the Canadian hidden economy; Figure 5 shows Giles’s (1999) tax 
gap estimates for New Zealand. 
[Insert Figure 4 and Figure 5 about here] 
As Breusch (2005b) demonstrates, the Canadian hidden economy series is ‘anchored’ in 1986 using a 
benchmark value (9.45% of GDP) obtained from a currency demand model based on dubious assumptions. 
The MIMIC model however determines the time-series profile which reveals a persistent upward trend: the 
series grows by 4.5 times (relative to real GDP) over 20 years. This implies that the real value of the 
Canadian hidden economy grew by a factor of seven while real GDP merely doubled. As Breusch argues, 
this is implausible and is driven by the MIMIC models questionable parameter estimates. 
 Similar upward growth over time is observed in the New Zealand estimates for the tax gap (Figure 
5), but with stronger year-to-year fluctuations. Growth appears to be strongest during the twenty years from 
1968, rising from around 1.6% of GDP to 3.5%. 
 Breusch’s arguments apply here also: the tax gap is obtained from hidden economy estimates and 
the average level estimated for the hidden economy is an artefact of the scaling of the data. In addition, 
since the tax gap is obtained simply by multiplying the ratio of hidden to measured GDP by total tax 
revenue, the issue of the appropriate tax rate to apply to hidden income is completely sidestepped. These 
tax gap estimates are, of course, total tax gap estimates and not estimates of the personal or corporate tax 
gap. 
In his assessment of Bajada’s (1999, 2003) Australian evidence using MIMIC models, Breusch 
(2005c) also shows that results for the size of the hidden economy – around 15% on average over 1967-
1995 – are non-robust due to sensitivity to the units of measurement of key variables. He shows that, when 
this sensitivity is removed so that results become robust, the underground economy estimates become large 
and negative. Bajada has since produced much smaller estimates for the Australian hidden economy but 
which Breusch (2006) shows are, again, based on erroneous methods. 
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NOTES 
 
1  See http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/tax_gap_facts-figures.pdf 
2 By contrast, much of the literature on compliance modeling does incorporate behavioral responses; see for 
example, Feinstein (1991, 1999). 
3 As an example of a behavioral response, consider the following simple case for tobacco taxation. Assume 
1 million cigarettes are sold legally for $3 per unit, $1 of which is tax from an excise, yielding $1 million in 
tax revenue. A further 0.5 million smuggled cigarettes are sold without tax, at $2 per unit. Based on the 
authors’ experience within a tax agency, a conventional tax gap estimate would suggest there is an 
additional potential $500,000 in tax revenue (0.5 million x $1). However, many cigarettes purchased 
illegally at $2 will no longer be bought when the price becomes $3. For example, those whose marginal 
valuation for cigarettes lies between $2 and $3 will smoke less or drop out of the market. Suppose formerly 
smuggled cigarette sales are cut in half when the price rises to $3, with sales of formerly legal cigarettes 
unaffected, implying additional tax revenue of only $250,000. That is the ‘true’ tax gap is only half that 
estimated using the conventional definition, and depends on taxpayers’ behavioral responses to changes in 
the proportion of the hidden excise base and the excise tax. 
4 Note that the term ‘direct approaches to tax gap measurement’ is quite different from ‘measurement of 
direct tax gaps’. The former refers to measurement methods used to capture tax gaps (for unspecified taxes) 
and which seek to measure these directly, rather than via hidden economy indices. The second refers to the 
measurement of tax gaps for direct taxes in particular. 
5 For those more familiar with standard econometric models, Breusch (2005, p.5) shows that, for the case of 
two indicator variables (the almost universal case used in practice by proponents of the MIMIC method), 
the latent variables model is formally equivalent to a standard simultaneous equations model in which 
indicator 1 is related proportionally to indicator 2 (plus an error term), and the latter is linearly related to 
the vector of ‘causal’ variables (plus an error term). 
6 The ‘randomized response technique’ is an established statistical method to try to solicit the extent to 
which survey respondents misrepresent their ‘true’ responses to questions where they are expected to be 
reluctant to reveal that true response (e.g. on the size of their total income). 
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